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The Perceived and the Named* 
Christian Metz 
The viewer of an image feels the need to "recognize" 
(identify) the objects which are represented therein. 
When the image is figurative, as is the case in photo-
graphy, paintiog, and film, it meets this need itself by 
offering objects to recognize. However, it can happen, 
even with strongly representative images, that the de-
mand of the consumer remains more or less unsatisfied. 
For instance, the westerner who watches an ethnographic 
film often remains perplexed by the objects that he sees 
in it but cannot name or classify (e.g., cooking utensils, 
hunting or fishing equipment). To name, to classify: our 
problem starts here, with the problem of cultural 
taxonomies, encompassing both the taxonomy of cultural 
objects and the cultural taxonomy of natural objects, 
such as zoological or biological classification, which var-
ies from one society to another. Phenomenology has 
clearly shown us that we live in a world of objects, that our 
immediate perception is a perception of objects, and that 
this arrangement is neither superficial nor transitory (so 
much so, I will add, that it is deeply reassuring, and that 
is doubtless one of the roots of its existence). So why not 
link this striking character of our lived world conscious-
ness with the even more deeply embedded force of cul-
tural classification and sociolinguistics? 
The case of nonfigurative images (modern painting, 
avant-garde films), only confirms the initial impressions 
that emerge from this study. Notably, the spectator very 
often has the tendency to forceably reintroduce to the 
image, by the way he looks at it, objects which the au.thor 
wanted to leave out. The vague forms, curves, blurs, or 
shadings become clouds or dancing waters; the rec-
tilinear drawings become railroad tracks. There are many 
fewer nonfigurative images received than are sent. And 
even at the sending end, the tendency toward representa-
tion is sometimes stronger than is believed by those who 
consciously would like to escape it. The free contours 
that we have in mind are often involuntary variations on 
objects of recognizable form. There are fewer nonfigura-
tive images than there are images that would like 
to be so. 
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Codes of Iconic Nomination 
Work in philosophy, and the psychology of perception 
and observation, taught us long ago that the identifica-
tion of tangible objects was closely mixed with their lin-
guistic nomination. The semantic organization of natural 
languages, within certain sectors of the lexicon, overlaps 
with the variable margins of shifting configurations and 
demarcations of perception. The visible world and lan-
guage are thus not without multiple and deep structural 
interactions, and these have not yet been studied in the 
detailed technical terms of intercodal relations. It is 
exactly to such a study that I would I ike to address myself. 
But one thing already seems certain to me: even if the 
connection between language and the viewed can hardly 
be conceived of as a complete "copy"-either one 
served by the other-certainly one function of language 
is to name the units that vision demarcates, and to help 
demarcate them. And one function of vision is to inspire 
the semantic configurations of language, and also to be 
inspired by them. 
Recently, from the semiological perspective, these 
problems, which are exceedingly old in themselves, have 
been approached from two sides-on the linguistic front 
by A. J. Greimas (1968) and on the iconic front by Um-
berto Eco (1968, 1970). I have myself devoted some brief 
analytical sketches to them, where the main interest was 
the articulation of the two sides (Metz 1971, 1973). That is 
really the heart of the matter. I have proposed the term 
"codes of iconic nomination" for the systems of corre-
spondence which explain that within figurative imagery, 
even schematics, one can instantly recognize and name 
objects. These codes are thus the constituent mecha-
nisms of "analogy" and "iconicity," or the impression of 
resemblance and reality that give us representative im-
ages. They contribute to the creation of fiction, diegesis,t 
and the pseudo-real. It is now time-and the general 
state of previous research does not deprive the undertak-
ing of all risk-to try one's skill at a more detailed and 
systematic description of these bridging devices. Be-
tween image and language, they facilitate the objective 
production of a whole network so interiorized by the cul-
ture that, on the one hand, the phenomenologists were 
able to describe them as spontaneous (which they are in 
effect) and, on the other, as deeply tied in the West to the 
Aristotelian tradition (quantitatively dominant even today) 
of diegetic or mimetic art, in short, representative art. 
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Which Part Image, Which Part Language? 
It is first necessary to delimit the object of this research 
and establ ish boundaries on both its sides. The codes of 
iconic nomination do not relate the whole of language to 
the whole of imagery. Their study should not aspire to 
exhaust the vast question of the links between the per-
ceptual and the linguistic but on the contrary should 
concentrate on one of its levels in order to attempt to 
better il luminate it. 
Lexicon 
On the side of language we will limit ourselves to the 
lexicon. It hardly seems possible, for the moment, to seri-
ously establish even slightly precise correlations be-
tween the perception of objects in a society and the 
phonological and grammatical structures of the corre-
spond ing language. This difficulty, which perhaps will not 
be eternal , is connected to another one which is more 
general and well known to linguists: in. spite of some 
interesting attempts1 no one has succeeded thus far in 
linking, in a convincing fashion, phonological or syntactic 
systems with social structures. It is across these two sys-
tems that language preserves for the moment its great 
relative autonomy in comparison with other institutions 
where the very existence of linguistics is founded , inas-
much as the discipline is distinct from sociology (but 
belongs to the social sciences since language is an in-
stitution). Of all the internal sectors of language it is, on 
the contrary, the lexicon which brings the most important 
and most immediately exploitable materials to those who 
wish to found a sociolinguistics. 2 It is clear that words are 
linked to culture (and, among other things, to the faculty 
of sight), following a shorter and more direct circuit than 
do phonemes or rules of grammar. Moreover, the lexicon 
is the only part of language wh ich immediately exercises 
the function of nomination, that is to say, which enumer-
ates the objects of the world and gives them a name. The 
referential dimension, which characterizes all of lan-
guage, appears in a direct fashion only within the lexicon. 
The dissymmetry of the situation is certainly reflected 
in the concepts of a semanticist like A. J. Greimas (1966). 
Semes, as such, constitute the "semiological level," that 
is, that level at which language articulates about the 
"natural world ." These are distinguished from classemes, 
whose entirety forms the "semantic level ," that is, the level 
of autonomy of the linguistic orgaoization. Thus we see 
the differences between semanticisms like "in an oblong 
shape," "made of leather," or "belonging to the feline 
species," which are semes or "nuclear" to the degree 
they are as diverse and specific .as the perceive~ ob-
jects of a culture which they desrgnate and constrtute at 
the same time. Units of meaning like human/nonhuman, 
material object/abstract notion, or animate/inanimate 
are classemes, or "contextual semes ," which have a 
more general significance within the lexicon and which 
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intervene in the naming of numerous tangible objects. 
Furthermore, at a different level, they submit also to a 
second classification (whose links are in fact larger than 
the first operated by the nominations themselves), which 
extends beyond the lexicon to grammar, where they 
often correspond to some formal markers. Thus we have 
the case of human/nonhuman, the difference between 
qui/quai in French, and who/which in English. Just as 
the classemes within a language are common to the 
grammar and the lexicon, the nuclear semes (which I 
will henceforth simply call semes, since this study is 
limited to them) are suited only to the lexicon. I will not 
discuss all the lexical semes but only those which inter-
vene in the lexicon of visual objects. 
To Recognize the Object 
In the domain of the image, the codes of iconic nomina-
tion no longer involve the whole ensemble of semiologi-
cal material. We no longer need to review every sense 
and all senses of the representative image. To recognize 
the object is not to understand the image, even if that is 
the beginning of it. It is only a question of a level of 
meaning, that which is called the literal ( = denotation or 
representation) , and not the entirety. The apprehension of 
relationsh ips between objects, or at least of their more 
factual relations, still participates in the literal sense, but 
is taken over by other codes. Notably this involves mon-
tage in the most general sense of the word, encompass-
ing the internal composition of the still unique image. To 
understand that one object, in a narrative, appeared only 
a few minutes after another, or that they are constantly 
copresent, or that one is to the left of the other, or farther 
back, is already something more than visually identifying 
each of these objects. The "recognition" should therefore 
be understood as an operation which articulates certain 
sectors of linguistic activity and not directly the whole of 
language over the whole of perception. 
From the Word to the Sememe 
If one poses the problem in this way, it becomes essential 
to know to what sort of linguistic unit the optically identifi-
able object exactly corresponds, since language in-
cludes units that are very diverse in figure and status. 
Common-sense response leaves no doubt-it is the 
word. The act of nomination, considered in its concrete 
and directly observable form, corresponds most often to 
a word, that which comes to mind when our eye recog-
nizes an object: "It's a dog," "it's a lamp." 
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Yet the pertinence of a word does not resist analysis. 
The word is a two-sided unit, with its signified and its 
phonic signifier. Accordingly, that which can "corre-
spond" to an iconic element will necessarily be a unit of 
the linguistic signified and therefore only a one-sided 
unit. The naming of visible objects is a case, among 
others, of transcoding. In all transcoding (translation, for 
example) the only direct transit is that which passes be-
tween the two respective signifieds. (I will return to this 
point, which is in fact more complex). Nomination is more 
than transcoding, though it is that also. It is clear that no 
direct correspondence between the signifier of an image 
representing a house and the signifier of the word house 
(or maison or casa) is conceivable. This is a conse-
quence of the "arbitrariness" of linguistic signs. The two 
materials are absolutely heterogeneous; one is outlines, 
colors, shades, and so on, the other an emission of the 
human voice. The optical aspects of a house bear no 
relation to the fact that the French word maison has four 
phonemes rather than three or five, and exactly those 
four. These are the signifieds which articulate one 
another, the recognized object and the meaning of 
the word. 
The lexeme (lexical morpheme) is another sort of lin-
guistic unit, smaller than a word, that for the same rea-
sons no longer suits our purposes. It is still a two-sided 
unit which includes phonetic elements. So, how shall we 
distinguish the signified of the word from the signified of 
the lexeme? At the level of the word or even the lexeme 
the signified can include several units which are quite 
distinct on the optical plane. For example, the French 
word chevre means both the animal called "goat" and the 
tool called "sawhorse." That is the problem of multiple 
meanings. 
In sum, the visual correspondence should have be-
come established with a linguistic unit that is a pure 
signified, which is smaller than the signified of the 
lexeme--or the signified of one sense of a lexeme, or of 
the unique sense of a lexeme with one meaning. But the 
linguistic unit we are studying can in certain cases coin-
cide with a longer segment than a lexeme or even a word 
on the condition that one always pictures a single mean~ 
ing for the signified of .the segment. The object which one 
names betterave ("beetroot" in English) is recognizable 
in an image, and corresponds in French to two lexemes 
(bette and rave) grouped here in a single word. The ob-
ject which one names pomme de terre ("potato" in Eng-
lish) corresponds to three French lexemes, which also 
happen to be three words. Nevertheless, as perceptual 
elements they are obviously at the same level as the 
French carotte (English "carrot"), where the nomination 
uses a single lexeme that coincides with a word. This is 
not an accident since within the linguistic order itself it is 
a question in this case of a sequence of several lexemes 
(eventually of several words) being lexically congealed 
and turned into a single lexeme. In the terms of Andre 
Martinet (1967) these are not syntagmes (free syntactic 
combinations) but synthemes, combinations which have 
been formed by the language once and forever and 
which enter the lexicon with the same status as unde-
composable segments. If a potato (pomme de terre) is 
red in color (rouge) , one speaks of a pomme de terre 
rouge and not of a pomme rouge de terre. As Martinet 
proposes the term "theme" for jointly designating syn-
themes and proper lexemes, we can ask that the visually 
identifiable object correspond at the level of nomination 
to one meaning of theme, which is to say exactly what 
Greimas3 calls a sememe. 
Cultural Taxonomy of Objects 
Each sememe (a specific unit at the level of the signified) 
denotes a class of occurrences, not a single occurrence. 
There exist thousands of "trains" even within the single 
sense of "railroad cars," and these differ greatly from each 
other in color, height, number of cars, and so on. But the 
cultural taxonomy which is contained in the language has 
determined to hold these variations to be irrelevant and to 
consider them the same object (of a single class of ob-
jects). It has also determined that other variations are 
pertinent and sufficient "to change" the object, as, for 
example, those which separate train and micheline.+ It is 
the same apportionment, so variable among different 
societies, of pertinent and irrelevant traits-in sum the 
same "arbitrary" principle of the enumeration of 
objects-which presides over spontaneous classifica-
tions that operate the perception of corresponding ob-
jects within the same culture. The sight itself is slightly 
obscured to the extent that the image does not determine 
whether it is a train or a micheline. Once it is demarcated 
the viewer of the image has the feeling of "recognizing ' 
the object." It is notable, then, that one false perception of 
the color of this micheline (if it is one) or of its exact 
length or of the metal of which it is made does not consti-
tute a comparable obstacle. 
~he traits that do not partic ipate in this decoupage of 
obJe?!s are culturally experienced as types of secondary 
qual1t1es, determinations superimposed as something 
extra and not indispensable to the immediate intellection 
-adjectival qualities rather than substantive ones. It is 
most often true that linguistic expression of these visual 
p~rticu.larities is conveyed by adjectives (a long 
m_tcheltne) or by certain determinants which are larger in 
s1ze but syntactically interchangeable with adjectives, 
a~, for ~xample , the subordinate relative phrase "a 
mtche~tne that goes very quickly." To the contrary, perti-
~ent v1su~l qualiti.es, those which, by their grouping in 
packets, determme the list of objects to recognize, ex-
press themselves in language through nouns. As we have 
known for a long time, the nomination of objects-
because there are also those of actions, to which I will 
return-proceeds by nouns. Traditional grammar says 
that nouns correspond to objects, adjectives to qualities 
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and verbs to actions. Simply, "objects" are only sets of 
qualities considered as definers, and what we call qual-
ities covers only those qualities whose proper meaning 
does not enter into the definition of the objects. 
Optically identifiable objects are, then, classes of oc-
currences, like the sememes which they name. That is 
why Greimas proposes naming them "visual figures" (the 
pertinent units) and then further distinguishes "visual 
signs," which will be singular occurrences, such as one 
drawing of a house or one photograph of a tree.4 But 
within linguistic tradition the term "sign" is too strongly 
evocative of the pertinent unit for it to have any chance of 
being made to designate the contrary. It seems prefera-
ble to me not to adopt a special term and to speak simply 
of "recognizable visual objects" as opposed to "visual 
occurrences." 
About "Nomination" 
One sees that the fundamental phenomenon of nomina-
tion is itself quite poorly named. In the word "nomination" 
the sememe nom corresponds to the English "name" and 
not to the English "noun." But it nevertheless designates a 
linguistic unit which is on the order of a word. Now it is 
only at the surface level that nomination proceeds by 
words. The real correspondences between the visible 
world and language are established at the level of perti-
nent traits, which are deeper and more invisible units. 
The word (nom) which designates the optical object only 
constitutes the emergent part of the system, a conse-
quence that is manifest by the play of the pertinent traits 
and their internal organization. When an iconic item car-
ries all the definitive traits required for us to recognize, for 
example, a bulb (electric light bulb), and when one has 
access to the corresponding sememe (ampoule =electri-
cal accessory), this last access is carried to the lexeme 
where it contributes to an articulation of the signified 
(here "electric light bulb" in all its sen~es, but ~lsewhere 
"bulb" forms a word by itself). And th1s word, 1n turn , 
functions as a two-sided entity, which also has its own 
signifier and can therefore express itself. The viewer of 
the image explains to himself, "That's a light bulb." In the 
complete process of nomination, then, the word does 
play a role, but only at the endpoint. 
The term "nomination" is not peculiar to linguistics or to 
modern semiology. It has come a long way, historically in 
languages (nominative case) .. an? ~lso fr~m a whole 
philosophical tradition. It cames 1n .Itself .. m. a condensed 
state, a certain concept of the relat1onsh1p oetwe~~ lan-
guage and the world, a c~ncept that has b~en_ cnt1qued 
since Saussure as what G1lbert Ryle terms na1ve 
realism." For him there was a sort of list of objects, 
preexisting their 'naming, and the words came to "name" 
(nominate) these objects after the fact, one by one. As 
long as we limit ourselves to the surface level (that of the 
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word or even the lexeme) we are inevitably drawn toward 
faith in this view. The word, the lexeme (and on the other 
side of the problem, the visual object, once recognized) 
is not the end product, because the decoupage of the 
world into objects (and of language into sememes) is a 
complex process of cultural production. At the heart of 
this process the central role has been broken down into 
pertinent traits: traits of visual identification on one side 
(Eco) and linguistic semes on the other (Greimas). 
Determination by Social Practice 
This double decoupage did not exist before social activ-
ity and the features of each culture. It is determined by 
them, and at the same time it implements them. We know 
that the Eskimo employ some ten different lexemes (and 
thus different sememes) for designating snow, according 
to whether it is crumbly, hardened, slippery, piled up and 
so forth (Schaff 1965). Each of these units consists of an 
undecomposable lexeme, while the languages of West-
ern Europe are obligated, in order to designate the corre-
sponding "objects," to form a nominal syntagme, which 
each time combines the appropriate adjective (e.g., 
powdery), with a noun that is invariably "snow" (neige, 
Schnee, nieve ). Thus our culture sees a single object with 
variable types, where the Eskimo see ten different ob-
jects. A perceptible trait like "crumbly" or "hardened" 
(with its corresponding seme), while pertinent to the Es-
kimo, is considered irrelevant in our languages, at least 
when the question is the "nomination" of snow. 
This variation in lexical organization is obvious in rela-
tion to a difference in the perception of snow, which is 
more subtle and more finely distinguished among the 
Eskimo. Each society lexicalizes the distinctions which it 
perceives the most clearly, and in return, perceives with 
particular clarity the distinctions which it lexicalizes. It 
would be a fruitless quarrel that would initially seek to 
know whether it is language that informs perception or 
perception which informs language. In fact, the one and 
the other have been shaped by society. 5 In our cultures, 
the modes of work and production are such that snow 
plays a minor role, and careful attention to its different 
states would be without immediate utility. The Eskimo, 
who hunt and fish in largely snow-covered landscapes, 
and whose very survival depends on that, are obliged to 
know the diversities of the snow well: those which permit 
the hunt, those which represent a danger of sinking, those 
which announce a blizzard, and so on. A society 
lexicalizes and perceives the distinctions for which it has 
the greatest need. 
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The Pertinent Traits of Perceptual Identification 
Vision does not identify an object as a result of the totality 
of its perceptible appearance, or as a result of the surface 
of the paper, in the case of the same object being in the 
state of " representation" in a drawing or photograph, 
which is to say, the object relayed by codes of analogy. 
Thus it can be explained that schematic representations 
of objects in which the majority of the perceptible fea-
tures have been deliberately suppressed are also recog-
nizable (and sometimes more so) than many more faithful 
representations which are far more complete at the level 
of material expression (more exhaustive in respect to de-
tails of form, color, etc.): representations in which the 
degree of schematization is smaller and the degree of 
iconicity greater (Moles 1968). It is noteworthy that highly 
schematized images are very identifiable (the whole of 
the art of caricature lies therein). Visual recognition is 
based on certain perceptible traits of the object and its 
image (to the exclusion of others), only those which 
keep-and for the moment, materially isolate-the 
schema and the caricature. If they are sometimes more 
implied than detailed figurations, it is because they avoid 
the risk of drowning these traits in the midst of others, 
thus slowing the marking of guidelines. On the contrary, 
the image which shows great detail sometimes becomes 
the image-jumble (!'image fouillee devient parfois !'im-
age fouillis). 
The Schematic Diagram 
The traits which retain the schema-Drat least the figura-
tive schema, because there are also some others (e.g., 
diagrams)-correspond exactly to pertinent traits of the 
code of recognition so well described by Umberto Eco, 
who has cited diverse examples of them.6 Others could 
be borrowed from caricature: arms raised above the 
head, a tall figure, and it is enough for us to recognize de 
Gaulle; bushy eyebrows, a round face, and it's President 
Pompidou. In certain comic drawings two protuberances 
on one side and two on the other are sufficient to repre-
sent the breasts and buttocks, so that we interpret it as 
"woman." (Needless to say, such a choice of pertinent 
traits owes itself to an ideology at the same time mis-
ogynous and maternalistic, so characteristic of the world 
in which we live.) The codes are the formal machines, but 
it is precisely as such that they have historical and social 
content; in this example, as in others, the opposition of 
form and content leads to an impasse. 
So, schematisme largely overlaps schematisation . The 
latter is a socially specific activity which consists of pro-
ducing materialized diagrams (schemas, in the precise 
sense). The former, on the contrary, is a mental , percep-
tual , and sociolinguistic principle of wide general bear-
ing, which makes possible the comprehension of 
schemas as well as of detailed images with a high de-
gree of iconicity and of spectacles from real life. Even 
outside all schematization, this is because only certain 
sensible traits matter in identification; visual occurrences 
which differ in other traits can be perceived as multiple 
examples of the same object, and not as distinct objects. 
If several drawings have in common definite traits of the 
visual object "key" (e.g. , a head and a shank, a certain 
type of serration), they can otherwise, and without disad-
vantage to the sociotaxonomic permanence of the item 
"key," differ very widely in size, color, diameter of the 
head, depth of indentations, and so on. 
In ordinary perception, or in that of strongly figurative 
images, it is the social subject, the spectator, who fabri-
cates the schema by mental subtraction of nonpertinent 
traits. In the case of schematisation, it is a specialist (de-
signer or draftsman), a "transmitter," who performs the 
same subtraction in advance and materializes it. The dif-
ference is that the process of abstraction and 
classification-the "subtraction"-intervenes, in one 
case at the level of recept ion and in the other at the level 
of construction. In the former it is absent in the stimulus 
but reintroduced in the perceptual act; in the latter it is 
integrated into the artificially constructed stimulus. 7 
Perceptual Exclusions and Inclusions 
It is again the schematisme, and in a more general way 
the very existence of pertinent traits and occurrences, 
wh ich is responsible for a rather striking structural par-
ticularity, common to both perceptual decoupage and 
lexical decoupage. Two "objects" can be contained in 
one another while otherwise continuing to stand for an 
autonomous and distinct item, so much so that one no 
longer knows whether or not they are of the same rank. In 
terms of set theory one could say that it is a matter of two 
classes which simultaneously maintain relations of ex-
clusion and inclusion. Thus, for example, the sememes 
and the visual objects automobile and wheel: the wheel 
is a part of the automobile and can be mentioned in the 
entry "automobile" in a dictionary of iconic nomination, 
but the wheel is also an entirely separate unit of the same 
"rank" as the automobile: our dictionary would contajn 
both entries, apart from each other and on an equal level. 
This apparent peculiarity, which establishes itself in a 
general and permanent fashion , is the result of the fun-
damentally classificatory and "arbitrary" nature of nomi-
nation. When the object to which one makes reference is 
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the automobile (the automobile seen or spoken of) , the 
wheel intervenes only as a trait for recognition, on the 
level of the steering wheel, for example. But the object to 
which one refers in other circumstances can be the wheel 
itself (for instance, in the case of a flat tire and its repair): 
it then is the thing which functions as a recognized ob-
ject, or that to be recognized, and requires in its turn 
those traits of recognition (e.g., circular exterior form, 
marked by a "center" and radial structure). 
In sum, a single material element can operate at two 
distinct levels of coding: as seme and as sememe, as 
"identificans" and as "identificatum" (or "identifican-
dum"). Objects which must be recognized constantly 
serve in the recognition of other objects. According to the 
multiple and diverse exigencies of practice, perception 
and the lexicon reserve the right to regroup their basic 
traits in other ways, into "packets" which vary in content 
and size. Each packet, which barely seems to be stable, 
is frequently an object. Objects are always equal as ob-
jects, even if one is susceptible to being "lost" among the 
traits of another on occasion-and only on occasion-
when the second remains an object and the first, ceasing 
for a moment to be, contents itself to participate in the 
decoupage of the second. There never exist any objects, 
properly speaking, which might be included within 
others: what one finds are elements (semantic and per-
ceptual) which the code brings into play at one time as 
objects and at others as parts of objects. In any case, 
this same code sovereignly arranges the list of objects, 
not only those items on it which are occasionally 
eclipsed . 
Language Perception: Their Double Relation, 
lntercodal and Metacodal 
The preceding reflections show that the correspondence 
between vision and language establishes itself at two 
different levels: one among the sememes and optically 
identifiable objects, the other among the semes and per-
tinent traits of visual recognition. The full significance of 
this duality merits a slightly more thorough examination. 
Transit by Signifieds 
Insofar as the sememes correspond to optical objects (or 
vice versa), the intercodal transit-the reciprocal articu-
lation of the linguistic code and the perceptual code-
proceeds through the two signifieds. In language, the 
sememe is a specific unit at the level of a signified. In 
perceptual activity, the "object" is equally a signified: an 
already found signified once the object has been recog-
nized, and a sought-after signified when the object is felt 
to be identifiable as such but has not yet been identified. 
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Within the code of visual recognition, the signifier is 
never the marked or suspected object, but the set of ma-
terial responsible for its being marked or suspected: 
forms, contours, outlines, shadings. This is the visual 
substance itself, the material of expression in the sense of 
Hjelmslev. 
If one considers the correspondences between lan-
guage and vision a result of a social process of in-
tellectual production which exists in an active fashion 
precisely to establish them, the transit by the signifieds 
represents the final, directly observable level, the final 
product of this set process. Thanks to pertinent traits of 
the iconic signifier, the subject identifies the object; it 
establishes the visual signified. From there, it passes to 
the corresponding sememe in its native language, the 
linguistic signified. This is the precise moment of nomina-
tion, of clearing the intercodal bridge. By the disposition 
of the sememe, the word or the lexeme which is attached 
to this sememe can be pronounced, producing the 
(phonic) signifier of the linguistic code. The loop is 
thus looped. 
The intercodal bridge can also be crossed in another 
sense, from the phonic signifier to the perceptual mark-
ing of the corresponding object and then to optical traits; 
or, in the absence of all real or iconic· "stimuli," to the 
mental evocation of the object; that is, again, of its perti-
nent optical traits. These two operations are so very 
common in daily life that one does not consciously think 
of them. Nevertheless, without them one would not be 
able to understand the following situations: if I say to a 
friend, "Pass me the pencil sharpener which is some-
where on the table," he finds it and gives it to me. Or, if 
someone tells me, "My sister is wearing sunglasses," I am 
capable of imagining a glasses-like object, even if my 
conversational partner's sister is absent and I know noth-
ing whatever about the exact model of the glasses she is 
wearing. 
When the perceptual signifier (trait~ of recognition) 
journies to the linguistic signifier (phonic emission, itself 
either real or mental), this is nomination. When it goes 
from the linguistic signifier to the visual signifier, as in the 
examples given above, one is dealing with visualization, 
which is the inverse and inseparable correlate of nomina-
tion (that is why this last term, in a slightly larger sense, 
can conveniently designate the entire phenomenon in-
dependently of its orientation in each case). The point 
common to the two orientations is that the passage from 
the linguistic to the perceptual, or vice versa, lies at the 
level of the two respective signifieds, the sememe and 
the object. 
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visual signified 
recognizable object ~ 
As long as one considers it from this vantage point, 
which is not the deepest but which has its own reality, the 
connection between the visual lexicon and visual percep-
tion remains on the level of ordinary transcodage. As a 
defining trait of the latter, I propose retaining the 
achievement of the transit by the signifieds. Transcoding 
is a highly ordinary sociosemiological operation, whose 
most typical form is translation; that is, a subcase of 
transcod)ng where the two codes are two l~nguages. 
The transit by the signifieds is neither an empirical 
peculiarity nor an exceptional act. On the contrary, it rests 
on a permanent and fundamental given: if the varying 
codes in use distinguish among themelves-if there are 
several, obviously-it is through the material and the 
internal organization of their signifier (visual codes, au-
ditory codes, etc.), or even by its organization alone when 
the material is identical (e.g., the plurality of languages), 
or, in any case, by the organization of their signifieds 
(Hjelmslev's "form of the contents") since it is the direct or 
indirects correlate of the organization of the signifier. But 
it is not through the material of the signified ("material 
content"), which is common to all codes and which is 
always the "sense," the semantic fabric. The sense, also, 
constitutes the universal intercodal footbridge. One can 
switch from one code to another when two units of form of 
the signified, belonging respectively to each of the two 
codes (which are never, in fact, superimposable), 
nevertheless occupy an adjacent position in the material 
of the signified (or, as one says these days, "have very 
nearly the same sense"). This happens when the trans-
lator takes a word from the source language and looks for 
an equivalent word in the target language. In sum, there 
definitely exists a level of relationships between codes 
which always justifies saying that the passage is accom-
plished across the signifieds. 
Representation as Metalanguage 
In many cases, and notably in those which occupy us 
here, this level of relationships is neither the only nor 
necessarily the most important one. Certain intercodal 
relations are really more than transcodage. The relation-
ship between language and perception is very different 
than that between two languages (=translation), because 
in this case the two codes no longer have an identical 
semiological status and no longer occupy the same 
place within the general process of socialization. 
I linguistic signifier 
I phonic emission perceptual I linguistic of themes 
code I code 
I 1 I I I 
I linguistic signified 
I ~ sememe designating 
observable intercodal transit the object I 
Compared with all nonlinguistic codes, and with itself 
when necessary, language is in the position of a 
metalanguage: a universal, nonscientific metalanguage, 
a "major equivalent" exchangeable with all other codes, 
as is money against all other goods. There are also scien-
tific metalanguages (formalized languages, mathemati-
cal notation, chemical notation), but it is still language 
which is used to introduce them, to preliminarily explicate 
them, and to define their field of validity. And within other 
domains, language itself, subject to a specific task which 
tranforms it in terminology-that is to say, in theory-
directly supplies the scientific metalanguage outside all 
specialized notation, or in simply taking one of them as 
an intermittent auxiliary title. This metalanguage consists 
then of a body of linguistic statements of fact; it can pass 
for the language of science itself. Thus the metal inguistic 
inclination of language, universal at the nonscientific 
level, is strongly reaffirmed at the scientific level. The two 
things go together, and the current social classifications 
are those of science. This is the problem of pensee sauv-
age, "the savage mind," so well posed by Levi-Strauss 
(1962): all societies are societies of "savages," all people 
are indigenes of some culture. 
If language is the principal metalanguage, this is obvi-
ously so because no other code is situated so tightly in 
daily social communications as a certain (abstract, ex-
plicit) form of thought. This is not the only operation but is 
by nature the most apparent among the operations of 
metalanguage. Every semiologist has noted that lan-
guage, through its relationship with other codes, oc-
cupies a nonsymmetrical and privileged position9 in that 
it affects the quantitative extension of the material of the 
signified (the total field of "things that one can say"). 
Language can say, even if sometimes only with approxi-
mation, what all the other codes can say, while the in-
verse is not true. (There exists, for example, no degree of 
approximation, if it were imaginable, from which one 
could allow that a reed pipe tune or a set of colors is 
capable of "saying" even so simple a phrase as "The 
train arrived at Lyon three quarters of an hour late.") Each 
code "occupies" one part, and only one part, of the total 
semantic material, which is to say, of the ensemble of 
socially possible assertions, while language occupies 
them all . Between language and the nonlinguistic codes, 
the proportion of "translatability" equalizes itself rather 
badly, leaning largely to one side. The advantage of this 
semantic extension has a great deal to do with the social 
status of language as universal commentator. 
The Perceived and the Named 
One of the most notable consequences of this situation 
in everyday life (the flow of perception, deciphering the 
numerous images which offer themselves to view in 
modern cities, spontaneous conversations about them 
etc.) is that language does much more than transcode' 
vision. Translation is another signifier of the same rank 
(the "verbalizer," as it is sometimes called by aud iovisual 
specialists). Language accompanies vision in perma-
nence; it is the continuous gloss of it, it explains it, 
clarifies it, to the extent to which it accomplishes it, 
whether spoken aloud or by simple mnemonic evocation 
of the phonic signifier. To speak of the image is in reality 
to speak the image; not essentially a transcodage but a 
comprehension, a resocialization where the transcodage 
is only the occasion, the necessary occasion. Nomination 
completes the perception as much as it translates it; an 
insufficiently verbalizable perception is not fully a per-
ception in the social sense of the word. 
If I mentally dis pose of a sememe (he I icopter, for 
example) and then I am unable to draw the correspond-
ing object on a piece of paper, it is not a matter of acci-
dental clumsiness; I am someone who "does not know 
how to draw," and no one suspects that I do not know what 
a helicopter is. But if the helicopter is drawn on another 
piece of paper and I am not able to name it-or, in any 
case, to find the sememe, lacking the phonic signifier, as 
when one has the word "on the tip of the tongue"-the 
situation, turned around 180 degrees, becomes much 
more serious. I have not understood the drawing, I actu-
ally do not know what it is, I am incapable of making it 
exist (at least at the level of representation I am discuss-
ing in this study). Language is not only another code; it is 
the metacode. 
To Transcode/Metacode: Relations between the Two 
Operations 
It is necessary then to distinguish the metacodal relation-
ship (relationship of the metacode to its object-code) 
from the intercodal relationship, which unites two codes 
on the same level, when each can function on occasion 
as "interpreter" of the other, but the situation can always 
be reversed. In the metacodal relationship the transit by 
the signified (where the equality of the status of the two 
codes becomes explicit) is not the main point. We know, 
following Hjelmslev (1953:Chapter 22), that the signified 
of the metacode articulates itself across the total 
signifier/signified of the object-code. There it is another 
sort of transit, a dissymmetrical type, which engages, in 
the case of more than two signifieds, one signifier and 
one only (that of the object-code). As for ·the signifier of 
the metacode, it constitutes, in this "unhooked" structure 
that is so well known today, the part which "exceeds," that 
which speaks the object-code in its entirety. Thus, in an 
oral statement, the phonic emissions of the English lan-
guagd help me to describe the signifiers and the 
signifieds of the iconic code. 
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signified of signifier of 
object-code object-code 
signified of metacode signifier of metacode I 
The simple intercodal relationship can be represented in 
the following manner: 
I code X signifier code X signified 
code Y signified code Y signifier I 
Only the signifieds ensure the contact between the two 
codes. The signifiers "exceed" both of them-each one 
can "translate" the other. The dissymetry cancels itself. 
These theoretical reflections find a striking illustration 
in the problem which occupies us. Evoking the cultural 
taxonomy of visible objects, Greimas (1968) considers 
that the pertinent traits of the iconic signifier ("traits of 
recognition" in Umberto Eco's terms) coincide with those 
of the linguistic signified-that is, with the semes of the 
sememe. This proposition seems to me of great impor-
tance. From a perspective of visual semiology I return to 
the linguistic analysis which Greimas made (1966:43--50) 
of the French word tete in one of its senses ("material 
object"). Permit me to simplify a little, in order to abbre-
viate the exposition. Greimas proposed four semes for 
this sememe: extremity (of a more immense object); dis-
continuous extremity (culturally felt to be distinct from the 
rest of what one would voluntarily call "the body"); super-
lative extremity (superior and/or anterior); and spherical 
extremity (or "swelling"). 
These are four pertinent traits of the linguistic signified. 
But there are alscr-and at this point the two things be-
come confused-four pertinent traits of the iconic 
signifier. If in an ethnographic film we perceive an object 
which is unknown to us (a hunting weapon, for example, 
or a musical instrument), and if this object presents at its 
anterior extremity a distinct part with a rounded form, we 
would not hesitate to perceive it as being the "head," or 
tete, of this utensil which was previously impossible to 
identify. All that our gaze would comprehend would be 
that one of the parts of the object consists of a known 
object, a "head." The four semes would then correspond 
to four physical (optical) characteristics of the visual 
signifier, that is, the visible "spot" which on the screen 
forms the photograph of this "head." In the same way, we 
recognize a "house," which could be seen in an image or 
next to a walkway in the countryside, thanks to certain 
perceptual traits which are separable from the entirety. 
The silhouette which we have before our eyes evokes an 
object constructed by man. It contains several walls, has 
a roof, a door, and so forth. These different features are 
also the semes of the word "house" in one of its senses 
(edifice). 
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The Return of the Signifier 
It is thus confirmed that the articulation between the 
taxonomies of vision and the visual part of the lexicon, in 
the bosom of a single culture, establishes itself at two 
levels simultaneously. The first is between the respective 
signifieds (object and sememe ), insofar as one considers 
this the ordinary intercodal relationship, simple "transla-
tion," the terminal list of surface correspondences. The 
second is between the pertinent traits of the signifier (on 
the side of the object-code) and those of the signified (on 
the side of the metacode) when one envisages the cul-
tural classification of objects as an active operation of the 
metacodal type in which the main point plays itself 
against units "smaller" than the whole object and 
"smaller" than the whole sememe, at the outcome of con-
crete nomination. One conceives of this articulation as 
the historical production of nomination, a production in 
which language, the universal commentator, comes to 
state the law and its partitions, even though in the final 
analysis it would itself be, like the visible world, entirely 
informed by social forces. In the following table, I repre-
sent the double relationship of language and vision. One 
ascertains that the two sides of the object-code (signifier 
and signified) articulate themselves toward the signified 
of the metacode, and toward it only. The signifier of the 
metacode, formed from phonetic sequences which des-
ignate the perceptual units, bears no direct relation to the 
object-code. It can only "speak" globally, and from the 
exterior, through the intermediary of its own signified , the 
metacodal signified. 
visual signifier 
(forms, contours, etc.) 







between pertinent traits 
~ 
linguistic signified 
: ... ~.....__---•• (sememe) 
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From Objects to Actions 
Until now I have spoken only of "objects." But visually 
recognizable "actions" exist as well. The problem of 
nomination thus moves from the noun toward the verb, at 
least for Western societies and languages, where the 
noun and the verb, the object and the action, are clearly 
distinct. Except for that point, the principle of analysis 
remains the same. Thus, in a film in which the images are 
blurred and difficult to read, it is sufficient for our pur-
poses that certain optical traits are clearly marked in 
order to perceive that someone has thrown something. In 
this example, it seems to me that the pertinent traits of the 
perceptible action, and of the lexeme "to throw" in the 
corresponding sense, are two in number (a minimal de-
duction but set in a potentially larger paradigm). 
1 Material object which distances itself from the body of the 
person (the opposite of "to catch ," "to reach," etc. , in 
which the object approaches the person). 
2 Muscular action on the part of the person (the opposite of 
"to let fall," "to let escape," "to let loose," etc., where the 
object distances itself but the person is passive). 
Clearly the analysis should be pushed further, moving 
closer and closer to the larger group of verbs of move-
ment, and to the larger organization of the visual world (or 
at least the principal gestural units). For example, the two 
traits which I have noted as the most immediately striking 
presuppose two others by an implied relationship: the 
"material object," or at least an inert one, here the pro-
jectile, and its opposition to an "animate being," a person 
or animal , or even another material object conceived and 
perceived as "active" (a catapult can also throw some-
thing). 
Noises . .. Sound Objects 
The perspective which is proposed here is equally appli-
cable to the world of recognizable noises and the corre-
sponding sector of the lexicon. This aspect of the prob-
lem is particularly important in the case of sound film 
(which in our age is all cinema), television, radio broad-
casting, and so on. Even so, it has been studied much 
less until now, because our culture grants a strong pref-
erence to the visual and does not pay attention to the 
audio sphere, except when the subject is the sound of 
language; of the two, the "noise" is often left behind.10 
How is it explainable that in the soundtrack of a film set 
in the countryside, or in the noisy confusion of a forest 
where we are walking, we would be capable of recogniz-
ing and isolating a lapping sound (clapotis) , even if we 
did not know its origin, and even if we identify as " lap-
ping," from one occasion to another, noises which are 
very different? One must admit that the " lapping" exists 
as an autonomous sound object, with pertinent traits of its 
acoustic signifier corresponding to those of the linguistic 
signifier, from the semes to the sememe "lapping ." Four 
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appear rather quickly, resulting from the "nearest" com-
mutations: 
1 The noise is relatively weak (as opposed to an uproar, 
howl, din, crash, etc.). 
2 It is discontinuous, which a distant hum, a whistling, or a 
background noise is not. 
3 It is acoustically "double," or, in any case, not simple, as 
each of its emissions can be decomposed into two suc-
cessive sounds/--!····!--····!--/. (In this respect, the 
first two phonemes of the French linguistic signifier c-1-
apotis can be considered onomatopoeic). The commu-
tation shows that the other identifiable noises do not have 
this character and that each of their emissions is "simple," 
as in "detonation," or even "blow" or "shock" in their au-
ditory sense. It is the opposition between floc and tac, or, 
to give some English examples, "plop" and "plip."11 
4 This noise is experienced as being liquid, or as being 
provoked by a liquid; the opposite of "rubbing" or "scrap-
ing" in their auditory sememe, which presents the trait 
"solid," or even "sizzling" and "hissing," with the trait 
"gaseous." 
These four traits, and all those of the same genre which 
I have forgotten, are common to both auditory perception 
and language. There would be no point whatever in ask-
ing whether they define the "lapping" (clapotis) as 
characteristic sound or as the French word clapotis, 
since the noise and the word exist only by virtue of each 
other. Our four traits constitute a level of articulation 
where the two things coincide, under the metacodal stat· 
ute of language. 
Ideological Reduction of the Sound Dimension 
There is a difference, however, between the visual and 
the auditory in our cultural definition. When I recognize a 
"lamp" and can name it, the identification is terminated. 
All that could be added would be on the order of adjec-
tives or determiners. On the contrary, if I distinctly hear a 
"lapping" or a "whistling," and if I can say that, I only have 
the feeling of making a first identification, a marking as 
yet incomplete. This impression disappears when I rec-
ognize that it is the lapping of a river or the whistling of 
the wind in the trees. The recognition of a sound leads 
directly to the question "What makes the noise?" There is 
something of a paradox there, since the sememes of the 
initial identification ("whistling," "sizzling," "rubbing," etc.) 
correspond to actual sound profiles, while those of the 
final identification (the wind, the river), which are not at all 
auditory, articulate the source of the noise and not the 
noise itself .. 
Within language as the metacode of noises, the most 
perfect identification is obviously that which simulta-
neously designates the sound and its source ("rumbling 
of thunder"). But if one of these two indicators must be 
suppressed, it is curious to note that it can be the sound-
object which suffers the least damage in overall recogni-
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tion. If I perceive a rumble, without further precision, there 
exists some mystery and a sense of suspense (horror 
films do not miss playing on this); the identification is 
only roughly sketched. If I perceive "thunder" without pay-
ing the least attention to its acoustical characteristics, the 
identification is sufficient. 
One might perhaps reply that the example is tenden-
tious because thunder is an object which is nothing other 
than sound (one cannot see it; lightning is what one 
sees). But the situation stays the same with objects which 
do not exhibit themselves through their noise. If I allude to 
the "throbbing of a machine," my conversational partner 
may consider that he does not know exactly what I am 
talking about and may ask, "What machine?" I have 
nevertheless been precise in the clarification of the 
noise, but remained vague on that of its source. It will 
suffice that I reverse my axes of precision by saying,"lt's a 
jet airplane noise," in order for everyone to then be of the 
opinion that I have explained myself clearly, and to feel 
satisfied. From the moment when the sound source is 
recognized (jet airplane), the taxonomies of noise them-
selves (throbbing, whistling, etc.) can only be supplied, 
at least for our age and in our latitudes, as supplementary 
precisions, not felt to be indispensable, basically in the 
nature of adjectives, even when they express themselves 
linguistically as nouns. At the level of discourse, one is no 
longer entirely within nomination, but already is moving a 
little way into description. 
Ideologically, the sound source is an object, the sound 
itself a character. Like all characters, it is attached to the 
object. Simply because the identification of the latter suf-
fices to evoke the noise, the inverse is not necessarily 
true. "To comprehend" a perceptual given is not to grasp 
it exhaustively in all its aspects, but to be capable of 
classifying it, of putting it in a pigeonhole,12 to designate 
the object of which it is one occurrence. Noises are also 
classified much more according to the objects which 
produce them than according to their own properties. 
But this situation is not at all natural: from a logical 
point of view, the "throbbing" is an object, an acoustical 
object, on the same level that the tulip is an optical ob-
ject. Language takes this into account elsewhere--or at 
least the lexicon does, failing discourse-since a great 
number of recognizable noises, reduced nevertheless to 
the level of characters, still correspond to nouns. It is a 
sort of compromise, which does not prevent auditory 
traits from participating more feebly than others in the 
dominant principle of recognition of objects. Further-
more, when one wishes to name the same concept as the 
sound-object, it is necessary, as I have just done and as 
the supporters of musique concrete often do, to add to 
the word "object" the attributive adjective "sound," when 
no precision at all is required for what should logically be 
called "visual object." We consider it evident that a flag is 
an object, but we hesitate about the ullulation of owls: this 
is an infraobject, only a sound-object. 
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"Sur un substantialisme sauvage" The "Off-Screen Sound" in Cinema 
Thus there is deeply implanted in our culture (and doubt-
less in others, although not necessarily all of them) a sort 
of wild "substantial ism," which distinguishes fairly strictly 
the first qualities that determine the list of objects (sub-
stances) and the second qualities that correspond to as 
many of the attributes as are susceptible to being linked 
to these objects. It is a conception reflected throughout 
the entire tradition of Western philosophy, starting with 
the notions of Descartes and Spinoza, which recaptures 
the preceding phrase. It is equally clear that this "world-
view" has something to do with subject-predicate struc-
ture, particularly strong in Indo-European languages. 
One can think that for us the first qualities are on the 
order of the visual and the tactile-tactile because touch 
is traditionally the very criterion of materiality;13 visual 
because the guide marks necessary to daily life and to 
techniques of production emphasize naming by eye more 
than by any other sense (it is only in language that the 
auditory order, as if to compensate, finds "rehabilitation"). 
The subject is too immense to be approached usefully 
here. It is even now possible, however, to begin to encir-
cle certain qualities which seem to be "second": thus ·for 
noises, evoked a moment ago, or the olfactory qualities (a 
perfume is hardly an object), or even such subdimen-
sions on the visual order as color.14 
In a clothing store, if two articles are of an identicar cut 
but distinguished by color, one considers that it is "the 
same pullover (or the .same pair of pants) in two shades." 
Culture feels the permanence of the object, language 
affirms it; only the attributes vary. But if two articles are of 
the same color and a different cut, no one would say or 
think that the boutique offers "the same color in two gar-
ments" (incorrect formula, and not by accident, in which 
the color will be in the position of grammatical subject). 
Rather, one will announce that these "two garments," this 
scarf and this skirt, for example, ".are of the same color." 
The articulation restores the color to its place, that of the 
predicate; these are two distinct objects which have one 
attribute in common. 
The division of first and second qualities plays a large 
role in one of the classic problems of film theory, that of 
"off-screen sound." In a film, a sound is considered off-
screen (literally, outside the screen) when it is actually the 
sound source which is off-screen. So, one defines the 
"off-screen voice" as that of a person who does not ap-
pear visually on the screen. One forgets that the sound 
itself is never "off"; either it is audible or it really does not 
exist. When it exists, it cannot be situated inside the rec-
tangle or outside it, since the property of sound is to 
diffuse more or less throughout the total environmental 
space. The sound is simultaneously "on" the screen, in 
front of it, behind it, around it, and in the whole theater.15 
On the contrary, when one says that a visual element of 
a film is off-screen, it really is. One can reestablish it by 
inference from what is visible within the limits of the rec-
tangle, but one does not see it. A well-known example 
would be that of "the bait"; one predicts the presence of a 
person where one only perceives, on one side of the 
screen, the hand or the-shoulder; all the rest is really out 
of the field of view. 
The matter is clear: the language of technic ians and 
studios, without their realizing it, applies a conceptuali-
zation to sound which only makes sense for the image. 
One pretends to speak of sound, but one in fact thinks of 
the visual image of the sound source. 
This confus ion finds itself obviously favored by a 
characteristic of noise which is physical and not social. 
The spatial anchorage of sound "givens" is much more 
vague and blurred than that of visual "givens." The two 
sensory orders do not have the same re lationship to 
space. Sound is much more constrained , even when it 
indicates a general direction (but rarely an entirely pre-
cise placement, as it is the contrary of the rule for the 
visible). One understands that film technic ians have 
based their class ification on the less elusive of the two 
elements. (It must nevertheless be remembered that the 
phylogenetic choice of an acoustical material , the sound 
of a voice, for the signifiers of human language, probably 
derives from the same reasons: phonic communicat ion is 
not interrupted by obscurity, by the night; one can speak 
to someone who is behind oneself, or is hidden by an 
obstacle, or is in an unknown place, etc. The relative 
weakness of the relation to space procures here multiple 
advantages of which the human race would lose the ben-
efits should it choose a visual language.) 
But to come back to off-screen sound in film, the physi-
cal "givens" do not suffice to explain the persistent con-
fusion between the sound-object itself and the visual 
image of its source; from the most literal definition, the 
concept of off-screen sound lies in this confusion. There 
is something else behind it which is cultural and which 
we have already encountered : namely, the concept of 
sound as an attribute, as nonobject, and the tendency to 
neglect its proper characteristics for the benefit of those 
of the corresponding "substance," the vis ible object emit-
ting the sound. 
The Perceived and the Named 
Conclusion 
In this study I have wanted to show that the perceptual 
object is a constructed unit, socially constructed, and in 
one sense a linguistic unit. Here we are already far from 
the ';adverse spectacle" of the subject and the object, of 
this there is, cosmological as much as existential (at any 
rate transcendental) within which phenomenology 
wished to establish our presence to objects, and the 
presence of objects to us. I am not so sure that this "dis-
tancing" is so great only on certain axes and does not 
carry along a complete rupture of the horizon. Obviously I 
spoke of semes, of pertinent optical traits, and so on; that 
is, of elements which have the property of not having one 
single existence and which are, on the contrary-on the 
contrary or precisely?-the conditions for the possibility 
of real life, the structures of production which shape it 
and which lose themselves in it, which find in it the place 
of their manifestation and their negation simultaneously: 
the objective determinations of subjective sentiment. To 
concentrate interest on this inconspicuous stratum is to 
stray from the path of phenomenology. But the obvious 
stratum-apart from the fact that it has its own reality, 
authorizing possible studies or already having led to 
benefit-is equally the only one which arranges from the 
outset those studies which its movement will then dis-
tance itself from. 
I have tried my best to comprehend why perception 
proceeds through objects. But I felt from the first, and still 
feel keenly, that it proceeds (and the phenomenologists 
do not say anything different) in effect as follows: in order 
that I try to analyze the "objects" which are so striking to 
the native (and from the start, in order that I be able to feel 
them), it was necessary that I myself be the native and 
that I be struck by the same things as he was. One knows 
that every psychoanalytic enterprise begins through a 
"phenomenology," following the term of the analysts 
themselves. That is not true in this domain. Each time that 
one wants to explain something, it is most advisable to 
begin by experiencing it. 
Translation Notes 
* This essay was originally published as Le per9u et le nomme, in Pour 
une esthetique sans entrave; Melanges Mikel Dufrenne (Hommage 
collectif) , Paris: Editions 10/18, 1975, pp. 345-377. It was then reprinted 
in Metz's collected papers, Essais Semiotiques, Paris: Klincksieck, 
1977, pp. 129-163. The present version modifies the original footnotes 
to separate references cited from actual footnotes relating to the text. 
t Diegesis (French, diegese) is a term coined by the French writer 
Etienne Souriau to indicate the denotative material of film. The concept 
is discussed in Metz 1968 (Eng. transl.1974:97-98). 
:t: ·Micheline is an autorail with tires invented by the Michelin Tire Com-
pany and used for the Paris Metro. 
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Notes 
1 I'm thinking of course of the famous Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and also of 
isolated attempts such as Sommerfelt's (1938) on the language and 
culture of the Aranta tribe of Australia. 
2 President day sociolinguistics, situated after generative tranforma-
tional linguistics, rightly tries to exceed the purely lexical stage. It also 
would like to exceed the Chomskyan distinction between "compe-
tence" and "performance," which rejects as pure performance impor-
tant social variations in the usage of a single national language. On the 
intersection of these two perspectives and the idea of constructing 
proper grammars (syntactic and/or phonological) as for example Black 
English (English as spoken by Black Americans) or that of other 
sociolinguistic groups, cf. the work of Labov and the variationist 
school. 
3 Is a sememe each "sense" of a lexeme (Greimas 1966: 43-45) or of a 
paralexeme (1966:38)? The paralexeme of Greimas corresponds 
closely to the syntheme of Martinet (1968). Greimas does not propose 
a special term to commonly designate the lexeme and the paralexeme; 
Martinet calls this the "theme." I follow Martinet here, because his term 
is particularly useful to me. The perceptual object can correspond 
equally to either a lexeme or a paralexeme (syntheme) , but only on the 
side of the signified and only in a single sense. Here, the Greimasian 
term sememe is the only one available. 
4 Greimas (1968) speaks of figures and "natural signs." The context 
shows that what he means by "natural" is "perceptual." (It is a bit like 
when linguists speak of "natural languages" as opposed to formalized 
languages or metalanguages, without a thought that these languages 
are also really natural.) In my text I prefer to avoid the word "natural." 
5 The same idea is found in Schaff (1965). It is that language is an 
"instrument" because it contributes to the decoupage of perceptual 
units, but it is also (like perception itself) a product, a product of social 
life. 
6 In Eco (1970:16)--a French translation of part of Eco 1968--"We select 
the fundamental aspects of the perceived following the codes of rec-
ognition: when we are at the zoo and we see a zebra far away, the 
elements that we recognize immediately (and that our memory retains) 
are the stripes and not the silhouette which vaguely resembles that of a 
donkey or mule. ( ... ) But suppose there exists an African community 
where the only known quadrupeds are the zebra and the hyena, and 
where horses, mules, and donkeys are unknown. In order to recognize 
the zebra it will not be necessary to perceive the stripes( ... ) and in 
order to draw a zebra it will be more important to emphasize the form of 
the snout and the length of the legs, in order to distinguish the quad-
ruped represented from the hyena (who also has stripes; the stripes 
thus do not constitute a factor of differentiation.)" 
7 In Metz (1971 :207-209) I distinguished two exactly similar cases by 
taking up and more precisely specifying the traditional comparison 
between the cinematographic image and the ideogram. I noted that in 
the former case it is the spectator himself who "makes" the schema; in 
the latter it is already made, or at least, in certain of its forms, notably 
the pictogram and morphogram. 
8 It is direct when each formal unit of the signified corresponds to a 
formal unit of the signifier; without either one or the other having fol-
lowed proper internal articulations (codes of the "symbolic " type fol-
lowing Hjelmslev). It is indirect in the contrary case (" linguistic" codes 
in the larger sense, formed by "signs" and not by symbols) when the 
level of the signifier and the level of the signified each have their 
"figures" (units smaller than the sign) which are not isomorphic; thus 
the internal organization of the signified is not transferred from that of 
the signifier. They are nevertheless dependent (from wh ich I derive my 
expression "indirect correlate") because the form of the signifier and 
that of the signified continue to coincide on the level of the sign, even if 
this entails diverging later on the level of the figures. In this concep-
tion, the symbol is a sign without figures (or the sign a symbol without 
figures). Proper languages are the best example of a system of the 
linguistic type, with figures: there is no bi-univocal correspondence 
between the phonemes or the phonic traits (figures of the signifier of a 
sign) and the semes, figures of the signified of the same sign 
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(Hjelmslev 1953). The Hjelmslevian distinction between symbolic sys-
tems and linguistic systems is better known by the name "symbolic 
systems/semiotic systems" or "symbolic systems/languages" (which 
fiqures elsewhere in my work) . 
9 See Benveniste (1969:130-131). Language is the only semiotic system 
that can be universally " interpreted." The same idea figures in the total 
work of Hjelmslev; see his paper "Structural Analysis of Language," 
appended in Hjelmslev 1953. Different codes other than languages are 
"restrained languages"; languages are "non-restrained languages." 
10 A widely held view insists that the privileged position of phonic lan-
guages leads in our culture to an underdevelopment of visual richness. 
And this is not mistaken. But this is even more true of the sonic rich-
ness of "noises," which are very directly in competition with language 
by virtue of the fact that they also have an auditory signifier. 
11 Onomatopoeia, which takes exception to the "arbitrariness" of linguis-
tic signification, represents the case where a direct link exists between 
the signifier of the metacode (language) and the set of the object-code 
(perceptual code) . On cases of this sort where there appears a "moti-
va'Lion" for the linguistic signifier, see the important work of Pierre 
Guiraud (1961 , 1962, 1967). 
12 In the field of semiology this idea has been developed in a particularly 
clear and demonstrative fashion by Luis Prieto (1966, especially chap-
ter 2, "Le mecanisme de I' ind ication," pp. 15-27). Every indication is an 
indication of a class. A class only has meaning in relationship to a 
complementary class (or classes) in the presupposed universe of dis-
course. 
13 I have already led up to this remark by an entirely different route in my 
"On the impression of reality in the cinema" in Metz 1968 (translated 
1974). 
14 It is not without reason that noncolor film, i.e. , black and white film, was 
possible (culturally as a result of demand) for many years and that in 
large measure it still is. Smell film does not correspond to any strong 
and generalized expectation. Sound and talking film, ordinary film 
today, is almost always more filled with speech than sound, so much 
so that the noises found therein are poor and stereotyped. In fact, the 
only cinematographic elements which interest everyone, and not only 
a few specialists, are image and speech. 
15 This is related to another characteristic fact of cinema today. The visual 
givens are only reproduced there by condition of certain perceptual 
distortions (the absence of binocular factors of relief, the presence of a 
screened rectangle which marks, on the contrary, the absence of real 
vision, and so forth). The auditory givens are reproduced on the condi-
tions that the sound recording has been properly done, and does not 
suffer a single phenomenal deficit in relation to the corresponding 
noise in the real world . Nothing, in principle, distinguishes a gunshot 
heard in a film from a gunshot heard in the streets. "Sounds do not 
contain the image" as film theoretician Bela Balazs said. Even so, the 
sounds of cinema diffuse within the space as do the sounds of life, or 
very nearly so. This difference in perceptual status between that which 
one calls "reproduction" when dealing with the visual , and that which 
one qives the same name, when dealing with the audible, is discussed 
in my "Problemes actuels de theorie du cinema," pp. 57-58 in Metz 
1973; also see Metz 1971 :209-210. 
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